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Federal Protection
Of Instream Values
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental and recreational values are of deep concern to
a large segment of modern society. Within such concerns are en-
compassed the preservation of water quantity and quality, as well
as of fish and wildlife resources. Nowhere have these concerns
been more strongly expressed than at the federal level of our gov-
ernment.
Federal involvement in instream use, planning, and preservation
is on the increase. This increasing federal involvement inherently
recognizes that the protection of instream values is fast becoming
a problem of national concern, even though the states have tradi-
tionally controlled the acquisition and retention of water use rights.
The notion of federal involvement in the protection of instream
values can be attributed, in part, to the failure of the states in many
instances to protect those values. It would be short-sighted, how-
ever, to limit the rationale for federal involvement to those in-
stances where the states could act but fail to do so, or to put the
entire blame for inadequate protection of instream values upon the
states. Indeed, there exists an affirmative right and duty in the fed-
eral government to preserve instream use properties, not only be-
cause in many cases the states have failed to act, but also because
there exist many situations in which the interest to be protected is
federal in nature or lies beyond the capabilities or jurisdiction of
any one particular state to protect. Still, at a time when the federal
government is becoming more cognizant of the need to protect the
environment, state inaction presents a serious obstacle to the pro-
tection and preservation of instream values.
II. THE PROBLEM OF STATE INACTION
Protection of instream values has traditionally met with little
success in state regulation and adjudication of water rights. Al-
though a number of states have enacted specific legislation protect-
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ing instream values,1 serious obstacles have impeded adequate pro-
tection on a comprehensive scale.
In most prior appropriation states2 the two basic requirements
for a valid appropriation are a physical diversion of the water to-
gether with its application within a reasonable time to a beneficial
use.
3
The diversion requirement, in particular, appears totally incon-
sistent with the concept of "instream use." Diversion is still a nec-
essary requisite for appropriation in the majority of prior appro-
priation jurisdictions. Indeed, some fairly recent decisions continue
to hold that actual physical diversion is essential.4 Nowhere was
the effect of the diversion requirement more clearly brought into
focus than in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co.5
Rocky Mountain Power arose under a statute0 which gave
Colorado water conservation districts the power
[t]io file upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water
of any natural stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the
1. The state of Washington has adopted the following statute as a means
of protecting instream values:
The department of water resources may establish mini-
mum water flows or levels for streams, lakes or other public
waters for the purposes of protecting fish, game, birds or other
wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values of said
public waters whenever it appears to be in the public interest
to establish the same.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.010 (Supp. 1976). See also CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 37-92-102(3) (1973) (vests the Colorado Water Conservation Board
with power "to appropriate . . . or acquire, such waters of natural
streams and lakes as may be required to preserve the natural environ-
ment to a reasonable degree").
2. The doctrine of prior appropriation is dominant in the eighteen
Western continental states, including Alaska, and in Mississippi. See
F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 10-13 (2d ed. 1974). "Developed in the arid
west, appropriation law is usually thought of as a system for water-
'short areas, where there is not enough for everyone, not even for all
riparian owners." F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 2 (1967).
3. This view of the elements required for a valid appropriation represents
both the traditional view and the probable weight of modern author-
ity. Compare 2 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 1243-44 (2d
ed. 1912) with 1 W. HuTcHINS, WATER RGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 366 (1971).
4. In State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972),
the court stated that "man-made diversion, together with intent to ap-
ply water to beneficial use and actual application of the water to bene-
ficial use, is necessary to claim water rights by appropriation in New
Mexico for agricultural purposes." Id. at 445, 493 P.2d at 411.
5. 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
6. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
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amount necessary to preserve fish, and to use such water in con-
nection with retaining ponds for the propogation of fish or for the
benefit of the public.7
The conservation district sought to file for the appropriation of all
the waters of a particular river, two creeks, and all their tribu-
taries, on the basis that they had been "a habitat for fish and the
propagation and preservation thereof for over 40 years, and [had]
been used by the public to fish and for the recreational activities
connected therewith during all of said period of time."8
Stating that "the rule is elementary that the first essential of
appropriation is the actual diversion of water with intent to apply
a beneficial use,"9 the court rejected -the argument of the conser-
vation district:
There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition
that a minimum flow of water may be "appropriated" in a natural
stream for piscatorial purposes without diversion of any portion of
the water "appropriated" from the natural course of the stream.
By the enactment of C.R.S. 1963, 150-7-5 (10) the legislature did not
intend to bring about such an extreme departure from well estab-
lished doctrine, and we hold that no such departure was brought
about by said statute.' 0
Rocky Mountain Power is an example of the approach to in-
stream use taken in most prior appropriation jurisdictions which
continue to espouse the physical diversion requirement. Interest-
ingly, the Colorado legislature chose to overrule Rocky Mountain
Power by statutory enactment. In 1973 the legislature amended
Colorado's appropriation statute" by deleting the diversion require-
ment. Thus, Colorado now defines "appropriation" solely in terms
of "the application of a certain portion of the waters of the state
to a beneficial use."12
Removal of the diversion requirement from the Colorado appro-
priation statute enhances the theory that physical diversion is not
required for a valid appropriation in modern appropriation systems.
One of the primary purposes for requiring a physical diversion of
the water is that it provides objective physical evidence of an intent
to make an appropriation.'3 In modern times, however, other legal
7. 158 Colo. at 333, 406 P.2d at 799.
8. Id., 406 P.2d at 798-99.
9. Id. at 335, 406 P.2d at 800.
10. Id.
11. COLO. 1Ev. STAT. § 37-92-103 (3) (1973).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 445, 493 P.2d
409, 411 (1972).
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methods for giving evidence of an intent to appropriate are avail-
able, with the permit system being the method most predominantly
used. 14 Illustrative of the permit method are the Nebraska appro-
priation statutes, 15 which require the "United States of America and
every person hereafter intending to appropriate any of the public
waters of the State of Nebraska"' 6 to file an application for a per-
mit to make such appropriation with the Nebraska Department of
Water Resources. This application is then recorded in the offices
of the department, if properly filed, and open to the public for
inspection. 7
Under the permit system, filing an application for a permit to
appropriate water constitutes objective notice of intent to make an
appropriation. As such, the diversion requirement seems quite un-
necessary for a valid appropriation. It is a vestige of the past which
is no more required for notice under the permit system than the
physical transfer of a clod or twig to the transferee of real prop-
erty is required under the modern system of real property recording
instruments. Yet, the physical diversion requirement is still a pre-
requisite in most prior appropriation jurisdictions.
Many, if not most, prior appropriation states now recognize
recreation and scenic beauty as "beneficial uses" either by statute' s
or judicial fiat.1 However, a definition of "beneficial use" which
includes recreational and aesthetic values may still present prob-
lems, particularly during times of water scarcity. Indeed, many
states have adopted constitutional provisions for periods of shortage
which prefer domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing uses, in.
that order, but which totally exclude recreation and aesthetics from
the priority scheme.
20
Past cases dealing with the "beneficial use" requirement have
tended to take a pragmatic approach to what constitutes a beneficial
use. In Empire Water and Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co.,2 ' the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado was faced
14. See F. TRELEASE, WATER LAw 38 n.5 (2d ed. 1974).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233 to 243 (Reissue 1974).
16. Id. § 46-233.
17. Id.
18. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103 (4) (1973) (defining "beneficial use"
as "also includ[ing] the appropriation by the state ... of such mini-
mum flows ... as are required to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree").
19. E.g., State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 51
N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1947).
20. E.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. 15, § 3.
21. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
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with the question of whether a resort owner's claim to the natural
beauty of a waterfall and foliage, which depended upon the natural
flow of a stream, constituted a beneficial use. While concluding
that there might be instances in which a purely aesthetic or recrea-
tional use could be "beneficial," the court held:
The laws of Colorado are designed to prevent waste of a most valu-
able but limited natural resource, and to confine the use to needs.
By rejecting the common-law rule [of riparianism] they deny the
right of the landowner to have the stream run in its natural way
without diminution .... It may be that if the attention of the
lawmakers had been directed to such natural objects of great
beauty they would have sought to preserve them, but we think the
dominant idea was utility, liberally and not narrowly regarded,
and we are constrained to follow it.22
Another problem for a number of courts with classifying general
recreational and aesthetic values as beneficial uses was the existence
of a public, as opposed to iiersonal, benefit. To them, a beneficial
use was something private and personal which could only be ef-
fected by an individual user. In Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake
View Duck Club,23 for example, the Utah Supreme Court set forth
the following dicta:
To our minds, it is utterly inconceivable that a valid appropriation
of water can be made under the laws of this state, when the bene-
ficial use of which, after the appropriation is made, will belong
equally to every human being who seeks to enjoy it .... If the
beneficial use for which the appropriation is made cannot, in the
nature of things, belong to the appropriator, of what validity is the
appropriation? The very purpose and meaning of an appropriation
is to take that which was before public property and reduce it to
private ownership.24
Although the cases which define "beneficial use" to exclude
public recreational and aesthetic interests are largely historical in
nature and have to a certain extent been negated by statute and
inconsistent case law, 25 general aesthetic and recreational values
still may not be recognized as beneficial uses in specific situations.
This is particularly notable in the case of constitutional provisions,2
which exclude aesthetic and recreational uses from the state water
use priority scheme.
A further problem facing instream use protection at the state
level is the inclusion of a "right to appropriation" provision in the
22. Id. at 129.
23. 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917).
24. Id. at 80-81, 166 P. at 310-11.
25. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
26. See note 20 supra.
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constitutions of some prior appropriation states.27  Such provisions
generally state that the right to divert any unappropriated waters
of a natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied to the
citizens of the state.28
The "right to appropriation" provisions have been construed by
some courts to mean that the state is constitutionally prohibited
from ever preventing its citizens from exercising their right to
physically divert and use all unappropriated waters. In Loup River
Public Power District v. North Loup River Public Power & Irriga-
tion District,29 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the "right
to appropriation" clause in the Nebraska Constitution had the
following effect:
A right of appropriation, under our Constitution, .... is a property
right which is entitled to the same protection as any other property
right. The right of property therein cannot be violated with im-
punity any more than that in any other type of property. This is
so fundamental that citations of authority are unnecessary.30
In State Water Conservation Board v. Enking,3 1 the Idaho
Supreme Court struck down a statute authorizing the board to ap-
propriate unappropriated waters for water conservation proj'ects on
the basis of the "right to appropriation" clause in the constitution.32
In so doing the court stated:
[Ilt is clear that [the conservation statute] attempts to authorize
the board to appropriate any or all the unappropriated public
waters of the state, and thereby to withdraw them from private
appropriation by any person who may desire to comply with the
Constitution and statute in the diversion and appropriation of
public waters. . . . If the board is merely an arn of the state per-
forming "governmental functions," it cannot, in the face of these
constitutional provisions, be authorized to withdraw from private
appropriation the unappropriaed waters of the state.33
It is notable, however, that in 1974 when the Idaho Supreme Court
once again considered the issue in Idaho Department of Parks v.
Idaho Department of Water Administration,3 4 it distinguished, if
not overruled, Enking.
27. E.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; IDAHO CONsT. art. 15, § 3; N.M. CoNST.
art. 16, § 2.
28. Id.
29. 142 Neb. 141, 5 N.W.2d 240 (1942).
30. Id. at 152-53, 5 N.W.2d at 247-48.
31. 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936).
32. IDAHO CONST. art. 15, § 3.
33. 56 Idaho at 732, 58 P.2d at 783.
34. 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974).
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In Idaho Department of Parks, the court was asked to determine
the constitutionality of a statute3" authorizing the department "to
appropriate in trust for the people of Idaho certain unappropriated
natural waters of the Malad Canyon in Gooding County, Idaho."'3
The stated purpose for enacting the statute was to protect the
waters of the Malad Canyon for recreational purposes.37  The case
was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court from a decision by the
Idaho Department of Water Administration which held that "in
Idaho there [could] be no valid appropriation of water without at
least a proposed physical diversion or reduction of water to posses-
sion.,'38
In response to the argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional under the authority of Enking, the court held:
[The statute] does not constitute a disobedience of the constitu-
tional mandate that the "right to divert and appropriate the un-
appropriated waters * * * to beneficial uses, shall never be de-
nied." The only authority contrary to that holding is the language
we determine to be arguably dictum in Enking, and to the extent
that this opinion is inconsistent with that language we overrule
the latter.39
The concept of an appropriation of water by the state in trust
for the people, such as that enunciated in the Idaho statute, is not
new. The "public trust doctrine" is a long standing and viable al-
ternative for overcoming the many obstacles which some states
have placed in the path of effective instream regulation, including
the "right to appropriation" provisions in their constitutions.
The public trust doctrine is based upon the proposition that the
state holds title to unappropriated and navigable waters "in trust
for the people of the state that they may enjoy . . . the waters
... freed from the obstruction or interference of private par-
ties."'40  Under this doctrine the state, as trustee for its citizens,
can withdraw such waters from appropriation for their benefit. A
number of states have embodied the public trust doctrine in specific
constitutional provisions which provide that all of the unappropri-
ated waters of that state are held in trust for the people. 41 Fur-
35. IDAHO CODE § 67-4307 (1971).
36. 96 Idaho at 441, 530 P.2d at 925.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 442, 530 P.2d at 926.
39. Id. at 443, 530 P.2d at 927.
40. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
41. "All waters within the State are declared to be 'the property of the
public' . . . in Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah
and Wyoming. . . ." 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
§ 6, at 12 (3d ed. 1911).
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thermore, other states specifically include in their "tight to appro-
priation" provisions a clause allowing state prohibition of private
appropriation when it is in the public interest.42 In spite of the
flexibility which the public trust doctrine provides appropriation
states in dealing with instream use protection in the public interest,
a number of state courts refuse to litigate the public trust issue.43
The problem of preserving instream use is not inherently limited
to prior appropriation jurisdictions. Even in riparian states44 there
exists no common law authority which recognizes the right of the
public at large to use the waters of the state for recreational and
environmental purposes. Although the riparian doctrine does
recognize the right to have the natural flow of the stream main-
tained against unreasonable diminution,45 and this principle ex-
tends to the right to an established flow 40 even for recreational
and aesthetic purposes, 47 this right is purely personal to the riparian
land owner. As such, he may enjoin the public from using waters
upon which his land abuts.4
8
III. THE FEDERAL PREROGATIVE IN PROTECTING
INSTREAM VALUES
A. Some Underlying Principles
A number of principles exist under which the federal govern-
ment can and does exercise its authority to protect instream values.
The most obvious vehicles for instituting federal regulation of
42. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (permitting denial of the right to
divert "when such denial is demanded by the public interest").
43. "While the legislatures and courts of many states have recognized their
obligation to safeguard the public trust, there are a number of courts
which persistently adhere to the belief that courts are not an appropri-
ate forum in which to examine administrative actions dealing with
public trust lands." Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in National Re-
source Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Ray. 471, 551
(1970).
44. States recognizing the doctrine of riparianism as the basis for acquiring
water rights include Hawaii and states east of and including Minne-
sota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana, with the exception of
Mississippi. See F. TRELEASE, supra note 14, at 10-13.
45. E.g., O'Dell v. McKenzie, 150 W. Va. 346, 145 S.E. 2d 388 (1965); Mid-
gett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d
599 (1963).
46. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
47. In Hoover v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960), the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the rights of cottage owners on a small lake
to an established minimum level of water as against a subsequent
riparian owner who sought to use the water for irrigation purposes.
48. E.g., Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 175, 89 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1955)
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water resources have been the property clause 49 and the commerce
clause,50 together with their resulting doctrines of federal reserved
rights and navigational servitude. These doctrines provide the fed-
eral government a far-reaching supremacy which authorizes it to
exercise its powers for the protection of federal interests.
Under the federal reserved rights doctrine the federal govern-
ment is deemed to have withheld from state and private ownership
that quantum of water sufficient to maintain federal lands for the
purposes for which such lands were reserved.5 1 This right is
grounded in the underlying proposition that the United States, as
sovereign, originally owned the Western lands, and thus the waters
and water rights on such lands as well.52 When the federal gov-
ernment reserved certain Western lands for its own use, it also im-
pliedly reserved the rights to all waters thereon in an amount
necessary to enhance and preserve those lands.
53
The implied reservation doctrine enables the federal govern-
ment, as the owner of the reserved water and water rights, 54 to
protect the continued flow of its waters 55 on Indian reservations"
and federal enclaves such as national recreation areas, forests, and
wildlife refuges,57 against encroachment by private and nonfed-
-eral public interests. An important feature of the federal reserved
rights doctrine is that it is applicable whether the stream feeding
the particular federal enclave is navigable or non-navigable. 5
The doctrine of navigational servitude empowers the federal
government to regulate waters which are used or are capable of
being used in interstate commerce.59 This doctrine not only author-
izes Congress to exclude discriminatory or unduly cumbersome
state regulation of interstate commerce on navigable waters, but
(enjoining members of the public from fishing in waters adjacent to
the riparian plaintiff's property on the basis that "the [river flowing]
through the lands of the complainant, is a non-navigable stream and
consequently private, the bed of which is vested in the complainant,
and is not public or vested in the public").
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
52. Id. at 703.
53. Id.
54. But see Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
55. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
56. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
58. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
59. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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also empowers it to enact substantive legislation and regulations
for the protection and enhancement of such commerce. 0
Although this doctrine, as originally enunciated, was limited to
clearing, improving, and maintaining channels and harbors for the
purposes of utilizing their navigational properties, that authority
has been extended to embrace purposes other than navigation. 61 In
fact, such activities as flood control6 2 and the generation of hydro-
electric power 3 are now considered to be within the scope of the
federal navigational servitude.
The concept of permissible federal navigational powers has been
so expanded that today they are construed to extend not only
to the pertinent portions of navigable streams but also to non-
navigable portions thereof, streams which are capable of navigation
with reasonable improvements, and non-navigable tributaries of
navigable streams.64 Under the aegis of this broad interpretation
of the federal navigational powers, the doctrine of navigational serv-
itude provides an effective means for affirmative regulation in favor
of instream values. Indeed, some courts are now beginning to take
cognizance of the fact that the destruction of aesthetic and recrea-
tional properties of navigable waters has "a substantial, and in some
areas a devastating effect on commerce."6 5
The taxing and spending powers of Congress authorize it to "pro-
vide for the. . . general Welfare of the United States." 6 The issue
of whether a congressional appropriation provides for the general
welfare is determined in the first instance by Congress, 6 7 and that
determination is decisive unless it was arbitrarily made and clearly
wrong.6 8
60. But see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533 (1944).
61. See United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940);
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
62. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
63. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S.
152 (1946).
64. See Comment, Minimum Streamflows-Federal Power to Secure, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 799, 805 (1975), and cases cited therein.
65. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1971).
66. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
67. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
68. Congress may spend money in aid of the "general welfare"
.... The line must still be drawn between one welfare and
another, between particular and general. Where this line
shall be placed cannot be known through a formula in advance
of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a penum-
bra in which discretion is at large. The discretion, however,
is not confined to the courts. The discretion belongs to Con-
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With the discretion concerning what constitutes the "general
welfare" vested in Congress, that term has a constantly changing
definition depending upon the needs of the times. In Helvering
v. Davis"9 the Supreme Court stated that "the concept of the
general welfare [is not] static. Needs that were narrow or paro-
chial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-
being of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
times. ' 70
Conservation of this nation's dwindling natural resources is a
compelling national need in modern times. It is logical, therefore,
that the problems of conversation, such as the protection of in-
stream values, constitute problems which affect the "general wel-
fare." As such, Congress can rightfully utilize its taxing and spend-
ing powers to protect those values. Indeed, as long as forty years
ago, the courts to some extent recognized that the power to tax
and spend for the general welfare includes expenditures for the
purposes of conservation. In re United States7' upheld the right
of the United States Department of Agriculture, under the National
Industrial Recovery Act, to condemn and set aside land for the pur-
poses of flood control, reforestation, and the establishment of a
wildlife refuge72 on the basis that such expenditures constituted
a valid exercise of the taxing and spending powers for the general
welfare.73
gress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
69. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
70. Id. at 641.
71. 28 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
72. It is clear that forestation, prevention of soil erosion and
flood control have come to be recognized in the mind of Con-
gress as public necessities if we are to conserve our natural
resources. Little question could be raised regarding the au-
thority of the state to fulfill any of these programs. Likewise
there can be no doubt that forestation, and flood control on
even minor streams, and control of soil erosion over a com-
paratively small area affect an interest which is "national and
general as contradistinguished from local or special." The na-
ture of the program for wildlife-reforestation projects indi-
cates an activity involving a scope much more extensive than
a single state.
Id. at 763.
73. There can be no doubt that projects looking to flood control,
re-forestation and prevention of soil erosion may in and of
themselves affect that "general welfare." As to the establish-
ment of game refuges there can be little doubt under any cir-
cumstance .... These activities may well be and are in aid
of the "general welfare" and hence in the "public interest,"
irrespective of the demands of the economic interests of the
country.
Id. at 764.
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Just as important as the power to spend moneys raised by taxa-
tion for the protection of the "general welfare" is the right of
Congress to withhold such funds if certain imposed conditions are
not met. The United States Supreme Court in United States v.
MacCollom7 4 stated that "[w] here Congress has addressed the sub-
ject. . . and authorized expenditures where a condition is met, the
clear implication is that where the condition is not met, the expendi-
ture is not authorized."7 5
Congress can, as stated in MacCollom, place conditions upon
grants of federal funds. Furthermore, it can utilize its powers to
withhold or terminate state funds unless the pertinent conditions
are met. In Georgia v. Mitchell76 the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, under the authority of the Civil Rights Act, 7
terminated federal assistance to the State of Georgia for failing to
take affirmative steps to cure the impact of its past segregationist
policies within the public schools. 78 The court rejected the claims
of Georgia, stating that "the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare was justified in utilizing the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §
20002-1"79 to terminate federal funds for public education. Armed
with this power, Congress has the ability to require state compli-
ance with activities consistent with its provisions for the "general
welfare." Since the protection of instream values is of extreme im-
portance to the general welfare in today's society, state compliance
with federal provisions for those values can effectively be enforced
through the withholding of federal funds f6r water-related projects.
The power of eminent domain provides the federal government
with yet another means for protecting instream values. Although
this power is not directly granted in the Constitution,
"lilt has not been seriously contended ... that the United
States government is without power to appropriate lands or other
property within the States for its own uses, and to enable it to per-
form its proper functions. Such an authority is essential to its inde-
pendent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the
74. 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
75. Id. at 321.
76. 450 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
78. The pertinent portion of section 2000d-1 reads as follows:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this
section may be effected (1) by the termination or refusal to
grant or to continue assistance under [a] program or activity
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express find-
ing on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure
to comply with such requirement ....
Id.
79. 450 F.2d at 1320.
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obstinancy of a private pex'son, or if any other authority, can pre-
vent the acquisition of the means or instruments by which alone
governmental functions can be performed." 80
Furthermore, as reasoned by the Court, in Kohl v. United States,8'
the Constitution by implication recognizes such a right:
The right of eminent domain was one of those means well known
when the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands
for public uses .... The Constitution itself contains an implied
recognition of it beyond what may justly be implied from the ex-
press grants. The fifth amendment contains a provision that pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation. What is that but an implied assertion, that, on makingjust compensation, it may be taken?8 2
It is well established that the government may appropriate
navigable waters without it constituting a "taking" for which com-
pensation will be required. 3 The rationale for the no-compensation
rule, as stated in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,8 4
is that the navigational servitude "is the privilege to appropriate
without compensation which attaches to the exercise of the power
of the government to control and regulate navigable waters in the
interest of commerce.18 5 In spite of the broad reach of the navi-
gational servitude, however, there are a number of non-navigable
streams and watercourses which are beyond federal jurisdiction.
The power of eminent domain, on the other hand, 'enables the
federal government to reach those non-navigable streams. A
private right in water is "property" within the fifth amendment,
subject to taking, for compensation, by the federal government.8 8
Thus there are few, if any, waters or water rights within the
United States which are exempt from the power. Furthermore, the
protection of instream values for the purposes of public recreation
and enjoyment constitutes a "public use," thus satisfying the tradi-
tional requirement that the taking of property, under an exercise
of the power of eminent domain, must be for a public purpose.8 7
80. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 237 (1946), rehearing denied,
329 U.S. 834 (1947) (quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875))
(emphasis in original).
81. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
82. Id. at 372-73.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); United States v.
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
84. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
85. Id. at 627-28.
86. Id. at 627.
87. Article 5 of amendments to the constitution of the United
States prohibits the taking of private property for public use
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B. Increasing Awareness of Environmental Values
The attitude of the federal government today is one of an
increased awareness of the importance of instream and other en-
vironmental values, as well as a cognizance of the need to preserve
those values. This attitude is reflected in a number of statutes en-
acted by Congress which are designed to insure that the federal
government will not knowingly encroach upon the natural environ-
ment.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196988 (NEPA)
requires federal agencies to "include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the human environment"8 9 an environmental
impact statement concerning the effect such federal actions will
have on the quality of the human environment.90 Although compli-
ance with NEPA is viewed basicially as a procedural matter,91 the
statement must contain adequate information "to allow a reasoned
choice" 92 by the particular agency whose duty it is to decide
whether the proposed federal action should be carried out. One
of the most important features of NEPA, however, is that it supple-
ments the traditional cost-benefit analysis of proposed federal
projects with additional environmental considerations which are
often difficult, if not impossible, to measure in terms of dollars and
cents.
without just compensation. If the use for which it is proposed
to take such property is not a public use ... then no proceed-ings for condemnation can or should be allowed.
In re Manderson, 51 F. 501, 503 (3d Cir. 1892).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1970).
89. Id. § 4332(c).
90. The environmental impact statement requires "detailed" information
concerning
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the pro-
posed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources should it be imple-
mented.
Id,
91. Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d 539, 542(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974).
92. Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870, 873 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied sub nom. Citizens Environmental Council v. Brine-
gar, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
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In Sierra Club v. Morton93 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit answered the question concerning how specifically environ-
mental benefits and detriments must be quantified:
"NEPA does not demand that every federal decision be verified by
reduction to mathematical absolutes for insertion into a precise
formula." Nevertheless, "an agency [must] search out, develop and
follow procedures reasonably calculated to bring environmental
factors to peer status with dollars and technology in their decision-
making." . . . However, every attempt to assign a dollar value to
future effects of present actions necessarily involves prediction.
, .. The decisionmaker's task nevertheless remains the same. It
is not to total up dollars and cents in a sort of profit-loss ledger,
but rather to consider the previously unconsidered by giving weight
and consideration to future generations in deciding whether present
economic benefits indicate that the depletion of irreplaceable natu-
ral resources should proceed in the manner suggested, or at all.94
NEPA clearly shows a Congressional intent to give environmental
factors serious consideration in all federal agency actions.
The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968)5 also focuses
upon the effect which federally sponsored or financed programs and
projects may have upon the environment. Whereas NEPA is
largely procedural in nature, the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act grants the President substantive power to establish rules and
regulations "governing the formulation, evaluation and review of
Federal programs and projects." 96 The Act seeks to foster "[w]ise
development and conservation of natural resources, including land,
water, minerals, wildlife and others;. . .[a] dequate outdoor recrea-
tion and open space; and. . . [p] rotection of areas of unique natural
beauty, historical and scientific interest."9 7 Through the enactment
of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, Congress has exhibited
an interest in protecting the environmental values of water and
other natural resources from federal encroachment. This interest
goes beyond a mere procedural consideration of the effect which
proposed federal actions might have upon those resources.
C. Exercising the Federal Prerogative
The federal government has utilized and, in fact, expanded its
authority to protect instream values. This has been done through
93. 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 827.
95. Pub. L. No. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1098 (1968) (codified in scattered sections
of 40, 42 U.S.C.).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 4231 (a) (1970).
97. Id.
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various congressional enactments and judicial pronouncements
favoring federal regulation of water quantity and quality.
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 98 is a prime example
of how the federal government has been empowered to protect in-
stream values. The Act is prefaced by a recognition of "the vital
contribution of our wildlife resources to the Nation, the increasing
public interest and significance thereof due to expansion of our
national economy and other factors."99 The stated policy of the
Act is "to provide that wildlife conservation shall receive equal con-
sideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource
development programs."' 0 0 To effectuate this policy, Congress gave
the Secretary of the Interior broad authorization
to provide assistance to, and cooperate with, Federal, State, and
public or private agencies and organizations in the development,
protection, rearing, and stocking of all species of wildlife, resources
thereof and their habitat in controlling losses of the same from dis-
ease and other causes, . . . in providing public shooting and fishing
areas, . . . and in carrying out other measures necessary to effectu-
ate the purposes of said sections .... 101
The scope of the Act is intentionally broad. It requires that before
any impoundment, diversion, or other alteration of any body of
water proposed or authorized by any federal department or agency,
or any other public or private agency under federal permit or
license will be allowed, the department or agency concerned must
consult the applicable conservation agency of both the United
States and the state wherein the project is being proposed, for the
purpose of protecting affected fish and wildlife resources and their
habitats.102
The provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act have
been made the basis for decisions upholding federal orders requiring
the maintenance of a minimum flow. In California v. Federal
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1976).
99. Id. § 661.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The pertinent portion of § 662 (a) provides:
[Wihenever the waters of any stream or other body of water
are proposed or authorized to be impounded, diverted, the
channel deepened, or the stream or other body of water other-
wise controlled or modified for any purpose whatever includ-
ing navigation and drainage, by any department or agency of
the United States, or by any public or private agency under
Federal permit or license, such department or agency first
shall consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of the Interior, and with the head of the agency
exercising administration over the wildlife resources of the
particular State wherein impoundment, diversion, or other
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Power Commission,'"° the petitioners sought to have a condition
removed from a license to construct an irrigation project. The con-
dition in the license required the petitioners to maintain a suffi-
cient water level below a dam in the project to support established
fish runs. 0 4
Finding jurisdiction in the Federal Power Commission by the
fact that "[1] ands of the United States in the public domain would
be used in the construction and operation of the project," 0 5 the
court upheld the condition in the license. Its analysis was not, how-
ever, based upon either the doctrine of reserved rights, although
the land was in the public domain, nor upon the doctrine of navi-
gational servitude, since "the river [was] not navigable."' 0 6 The
court rather based its holding on the contention that the condition
was proper, in view of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
"manifesting legislative concern with the preservation of fish and
wildlife resources," 0 7 coupled with the "prospect . . . that the en-
tire Tuolumme fish run [would] be destroyed in the near future."' 08
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act has also been instrumen-
tal in taking the "federal government beyond its traditionally recog-
nized jurisdiction over navigation. In Zabel v. Tabb, 0 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a Florida
District Court order" 0 requiring the Secretary of the Army to issue
a permit to dredge and fill in navigable waters for the purpose of
constructing a trailer park. The lower court order was issued on
the basis "that the Secretary of the Army and his functionary, the
Chief of Engineers, had no power to consider anything except inter-
ference with navigation.""' The court of appeals eloquently re-
jected this argument," 2 holding that under the dictates of the Fish
control facility is to be constructed, with a view to the conser-
vation of wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage
to such resources ....
Id.
103. 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
104. Id. at 919.
105. Id. at 921.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 928.
108. Id.
109. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (,1971).
110. Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
111. 430 F.2d at 201.
112. We hold that nothing in the statutory structure compels theSecretary to close his eyes to all that others see or think they
see. The establishment was entitled, if not required, to con-
sider ecological factors and, being persuaded by them, to deny
that which might have been granted routinely five, ten, or
fifteen years ago before man's explosive increase made all, in-
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and Wildlife Coordination Act and NEPA, the Secretary of the Army
could refuse to authorize projects in navigable waters on ecological
grounds even though the proposed project would not interfere with
navigation, flood control, or the production of power. 113
The permit in controversy in Zabel was required under section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act,114 which, among
other things, makes it unlawful "to excavate or fill, or in any man-
ner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity
of . . .any navigable water of the United States" 1 5 without the
recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and the authorization
of the Secretary of the Army. In reading the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act into that statute, the court vested the Corps of
Engineers with the right and power to protect instr'eam values
when considering the approval of such permits. Indeed, even Con-
gress has stressed that in all federal investigations and improve-
ments under the jurisdiction of the Corps, "said investigations and
improvements shall include a due regard for wildlife conserva-
tion." 1 6 This regard for instream values and wildlife habitat is,
however, in conflict with a number of other obligations imposed
upon the Corps by Congress.
The power of the Corps to engage in the improvement of rivers
and harbors also includes such responsibilities as maintaining au-
thorized river and harbor projects in excess of authorized depths
"where such excess depths have been provided by the United States
for defense purposes and whenever the Chief of Engineers deter-
mines that such waterways also serve essential needs of general
commerce." 1 7 Likewise, the Corps is authorized to provide for a
comprehensive program of eradication and control of aquatic plant
growths in the interests of such things as navigation, flood control,
and agriculture."18 It is clear, therefore, that the protection of in-
stream values is often in direct conflict with other duties which
the Corps is obligated to perform. Indeed, the protection and en-
cluding Congress, aware of civilization's potential destruction
from breathing its own polluted air and drinking its own in-
fected water and the immeasurable loss from a silent-spring-
like disturbance of nature's economy.
Id.
113. This view was based upon the court's reading NEPA and the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act together. The court stated that, in view of
these acts, "there is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse on con-
servation grounds to grant a permit." Id. at 214.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 540.
117. Id. § 562a.
118. Id. § 610.
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hancement of commerce and the national defense is incompatible
with environmental needs more often than not. Since the tradi-
tional role of the Corps of Engineers has been to promote commerce
and the national defense, it is likely that environmental values will
be given little consideration by the Corps whenever a conflict arises
between defense and commerce, on the one hand, and protection
of instream values, on the other. Nevertheless, the Zabel sanction
of the right to deny a permit on purely ecological grounds unrelated
to commerce or defense is an indication of the impact which the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act has had upon federal water
regulation.
Another 'example of the impact of the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act was exemplified in United States v. Stoeco Homes,
Inc."1 9 Stoeco viewed the Act, together with NEPA, as expanding
the federal navigational powers to include the power to regulate
any use of navigable waters:
The expansive definition of the federal government's naviga-
tional servitude may be traced to the enactment in 1958 of The
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act ... and of The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 .... Prior to these enactments the
chief concerns of the Army Corps of Engineers were ... the pre-
vention of encroachments on the navigational servitude which the
government intended to use for some other purpose, such as flood
control .... 120
Using this expansive definition of the federal navigational powers,
the court held that although neither the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act nor NEPA by their express terms applied to state or
private activities, "Congressional legislative power under the com-
merce clause would be broad enough to encompass federal regula-
tion of any activities affecting the marine ecology"'12 in any
navigable stream.
The federal reserved rights doctrine has also been utilized and
expanded to provide far-reaching protection of instream values.
An important case applying that doctrine arose under a reservation
made pursuant to the American Antiquities Preservation Act. 12 2
This Act gives the President discretionary power to proclaim land-
marks and other objects of historic, prehistoric, or scientific interest
on lands controlled by the federal government to be national
monuments. 23 It also authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
119. 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
120. Id. at 606.
121. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
122. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431 to 433n (1976).
123. The President of the United States is authorized, in his dis-
cretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
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accept a relinquishment of such items by the private and state
sectors to the federal government. 1 24
Cappaert v. United States12 5 arose out of a presidential procla-
mation issued under the authority of the American Antiquities
Preservation Act by President Truman in 1952.126 That proclama-
tion withdrew from the public domain a forty-acre tract of land
in Nevada containing a body of water known as Devil's Hole, a rem-nant of the prehistoric Death Valley Lake system. 2 7 The primary
purpose for issuing this proclamation was the preservation of an
unusual race of desert fish of scientific interest, called pupfish,
which was to be found nowhere else in the world.
28
In 1968, the petitioners began pumping groundwater for private
use from the same aquifer which fed Devil's Hole, thereby re-
ducing the water level and endangering the fish. 2 9 Subsequently,
they applied to the Nevada State Engineer for a permit to change
the amount of water drawn from several of their wells133° The
United States filed a protest requesting either denial of the applica-
tion or, in the alternative, postponement of the request until the
government could determine which, if any, of petitioners' wells
were contributing to the declining water level in Devil's Hole.131
Both of these requests were denied by the state engineer, who
granted the application. 3 2
The United States then brought an original action in the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada for a declaratory
order establishing its rights to use so much of the water appur-
tenant to Devil's Hole as was necessary to maintain the pupfish,
and for an injunction to keep the petitioners from pumping water,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic
or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned
or controlled by the Government of the United States to be
national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof par-
cels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined
to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and man-
agement of the objects to be protected.
Id. § 431.
124. Id.
125. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
126. Pres. Proclamation No. 2961, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1949-1953 Compilation).
127. 426 U.S. at 131.
128. See Pres. Proclamation No. 2961, supra note 126.
129. 426 U.S. at 133-34.
130. Id. at 134.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 134-35.
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except for domestic purposes. 18 3  The court granted the injunc-
tion' 34 on the basis that the pupfish was a species which the public
had an interest in preserving.135 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court' 3 6 and remanded the case to that court for the purpose of
"retain[ing] continuing jurisdiction so that it may promptly act if
a change in water level is required to preserve and protect the pup-
fish in the Devil's Hole pool."' 37
On appeal,' 8 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the ninth circuit. In so doing, it rejected the argument
of the petitioners that the American Antiquities Preservation Act
did not give the President authority to preserve the water level
of a pool, but only to reserve lands for the purpose of protecting
archaeological sites, by stating that
the language of the Act which authorizes the President to proclaim
as national monuments "historic landmarks, historic and prehis-
toric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Gov-
ernment" is not so limited. The pool in Devil's Hole and its rare
inhabitants are "objects of historic or scientific interest.""19
The Court likewise rejected the petitioners' claim that the
doctrine of implied reservation of water rights was inapplicable to
groundwater. While stating that even if such was the rule, the
implied reservation doctrine would apply in this situation because
"the water in the pool [was] surface water,1 40 the Court made
it quite clear that the implied reservation doctrine did not turn
upon any technical distinction between surface and groundwater:
The federal water rights were being depleted because, as the evi-
dence showed, the "[g]round water and surface water are physi-
cally interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle."...
Thus, since the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine is based on
the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation,
we hold that the United States can protect its water from subse-
quent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or ground
water.141
133. This case had a long history in the federal courts. However, the pro-
ceeding from which the Supreme Court appeal was ultimately taken
was United States v. Cappaert, 375 F. Supp. 456 (D. Nev. 1974).
134. Id. at 461.
135. See 16 U.S.C. § 668aa (1976).
136. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 322.
138. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
139. Id. at 142.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 142-43 (footnote omitted).
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This finding by the Court that the implied reservation doctrine is
applicable to both surface and groundwater is of tremendous sig-
nificance, since that doctrine had never been applied to ground-
water prior to Cappaert. 1 42 Cappaert, therefore, opens the door to
the federal government to apply the reserved rights doctrine in
those instances in which water quantity and quality is being affected
not by direct diversion but by depletion of the common aquifer
through the pumping of water by users situated miles from federal
lands. It is, furthermore, applicable regardless of whether such
other water rights are obtained and protected under state law. In-
deed, as stated by the Court, "Federal water rights are not depend-
ent upon state law or state procedures and they need not be adjudi-
cated in state courts." 143
The Endangered Species Act 1 44 is another statute which author-
izes the federal government to act to protect instream values, albeit
in a fairly limited setting. In this Act, Congress recognized that
certain species of fish, wildlife, and plants in danger of 'extinction
were "of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational,
and scientific value to the Nation and its people.' 14 5 One of Con-
gress' stated purposes for enacting the Act was "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved."' 46 In furtherance of that
policy Congress directed "that all Federal departments and agencies
shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species
and shall utilize their authorities' 47 in furtherance of that goal.
The Endangered Species Act also gives the Secretaries of the
Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture 148 standards for determining
whether a particular species is endangered, 149 and the authority to
142. As noted by the Court, "[n]o cases of this Court have applied the
doctrine of implied reservation of water rights to ground water." Id.
at 142.
143. Id. at 145.
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ .1531-1543 (1976).
145. Id. § 1531 (a) (3).
146. Id. § 1531 (b).
147. Id. § 1531 (c) (emphasis added).
148, "The term 'Secretary' means . . . the Secretary of the Interior or the
Secretary of Commerce . . . except that with respect to the enforce-
ment of the provisions . . . which pertain to the importation or ex-
portation of terrestrial plants, the term means the Secretary of Agri-
culture." Id. § 1532 (10).
149. The Secretary shall by regulation determine whether any
species is an endangered species or a threatened species be-
cause of any of the following factors:
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
(2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, scientific, or
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protect that species by regulation if such is found to be the case.150
Although the main thrust of the Endangered Species Act is
directed toward insuring that acts of federal agencies will not
"jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of
habitat of such species," 151 it provides also for application of the
Act to nonfederal actions as well "by consultation with the States
concerned."'152 Even in those cases in which state cooperation is not
forthcoming the federal government is not powerless to protect a
species, as the Act authorizes the federal government to exercise
its powers of condemnation for the purpose of acquiring whatever
land or water is reasonably necessary to protect the endangered
species and its habitat. 53
The Endangered Species Act has set the stage for possible far-
reaching and effective federal protection of instream values. In
Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority,'54 environmental groups
brought an action under the Act to enjoin the Tennessee Valley
Authority from completing a dam which threatened to impound a
section of the Little Tennessee River. The basis for the suit was
that such an impoundment endangered the habitat of the snail
darter, "a unique and theretofore unknown species of fish."'1 5 In
the original action 156 the district court 'judge refused to grant the
educational purposes;
(3) disease or predation;
(4) the inadequacy of regulatory mechanisms;
or (5) other natural or manmade factors affecting its con-
tinued existence.
Id. § 1533 (a) (1).
150. Under subsection (c) of section 1533, the Secretary of the Interior is
required to publish a list of all species found to be threatened or en-
dangered. The Secretaries of the Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture
are then required to "issue such regulations as [they deem] necessary
and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species." Id.§ 1533 (d).
151. Id. § 1536. The scope of the Act is extremely broad, considering that
section 1536 defines "federal interest" as including any "actions au-
thorized, funded, or carried out" by an agency of the federal govern-
ment.
152. Id. § 1535 (a).
153. Id. § 1534. This section authorizes the 'Secretary of the Interior to
"utilize the land acquisition and other authority" of various other acts
to protect species that are endangered by nonfederal actions.
154. 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977) (No.
76-1701).
155. Id. at 1067.
156. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
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injunction even though it had been proved that the proposed dam
would adversely affect, or even destroy, the habitat of the snail
darter. The judge held that because the project predated the Act
and could not reasonably be modified, the Act did not require that
it be halted.157
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit disagreed:
TVA argues that closure of the Tellico Dam, as the last stage of
a ten year project, falls outside the legitimate purview of the Act
if it is rationally construed. TVA cautions that it would lead to
absurd results if we were to include the terminal phases of on-
going projects among the "actions" of departments and agencies to
be scrutinized for compliance. We find this familiar line of reason-
ing unpersuasive and believe that the District Court erred in adopt-
ing it.158
Holding that ongoing projects were not excluded from the Endan-
gered Species Act, the court reversed the district court and
remanded the case "with instructions that a permanent injunction
issue halting all activities incident to the . . . [p1roject which may
destroy or modify the critical habitat of the snail darter,"'159 until
such time that "Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts [the
project] from compliance with the Act or the snail darter has
been deleted from the list of endangered species. . . .16O0
The injunction issued by the court of appeals in Hill completely
halted a project which had been under construction for ten years
and which was nearing its final stages of completion. Although
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear this case,16' if
not overturned by that Court, Hill will give proponents of instream
values substantial power to enjoin projects which threaten endan-
gered species witha loss of habitat.
The Endangered Species Act has also been construed to protect
the habitat of an endangered species from private encroachment
where the federal action by itself posed no threat to such habitat.
157. According to the district court judge,
This case must be viewed in the context of its particular
facts and circumstances. We go no further than to hold that
the Act does not operate in such a manner as to halt the com-
pletion of this particular project. A far different situation
would be presented if the project were capable of reasonable
modifications that would insure compliance with the Act or if
the project had not been underway for nearly a decade.
Id. at 763.
158. 549 F.2d at 1070.
159. Id. at 1075.
160. Id.
161. 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977) (No. 76-1701).
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In National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman,' -6 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court de-
cision' 3 and granted an injunction to prevent construction of a
highway across a portion of land upon which an endangered species
of bird, known as the Mississippi Sandhill Crane nested. The court
issued the injunction on the basis that even though danger
"[would] not come from the physical existence of the facility [it
would come] from the inherent development which accompanies a
new highway." 64 It rejected the contention that the Secretary of
Transportation had adequately considered the effects of the high-
way on the crane because, according to the court, he had failed
to take into account the loss of habitat which would result from
private development through "excavation of and drainage caused
by borrow pits,"165 and the resulting loss of the crane's primary
water source.
As demonstrated, the Endangered Species Act has provided in-
terested environmentalists with a powerful weapon to be used in
combating the destruction of instream values where an endangered
or threatened species is concerned. If the Hill case is upheld, indica-
tions are that the power to protect these values will be greatly en-
hanced. There are, however, a number of features about the En-
dangered Species Act which keep it from being effective as a com-
prehensive federal act for the protection of instream values.
The reach of the Endangered Species Act is inherently narrow,
touching only those federal actions which adversely affect certain
species of wildlife threatened with extinction. Furthermore, the
Act runs at cross purposes with a number of separate statutory pro-
visions which seek to improve the quality of the human environ-
ment in other ways. Indeed, the Federal Power Commission in Hill
was merely operating pursuant to the Federal Power Act,160 which
directed it to utilize water resources for "public purposes."''1 7
When the relative importance of human comfort and advancement
is weighed against instream and other environmental objectives, it
is highly doubtful that the balance will often weigh more heavily
in favor of the protection of the habitats of threatened species of
wildlife, particularly at the high cost represented in Hill.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 68 represents a specific instance
in which Congress has provided directly for the preservation of
162. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
163. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
164. 529 F.2d at 366.
165. Id. at 373.
166. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a) to 823 (1976).
167. See id. § 797(a).
168. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976).
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natural instream values. This Act established a national wild and
scenic rivers system comprised of rivers "(i) that are authorized
for inclusion therein by Act of Congress, or (ii) that are designated
as wild, scenic or recreational rivers by or pursuant to an act of
the legislature of the State or States through which they flow."6 9
Under this Act either the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary
of Agriculture is authorized to recommend rivers for inclusion in
the wild and scenic rivers system.170
The basic requirements for eligible rivers, under the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, are that they be rivers "which, with immediate
environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recrea-
tional, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar
values,"' 71 and that they be "in [their] free-flowing condition, or
• . . [restored] to this condition.' 72 A major goal of the Act is
to make certain that such rivers "shall be preserved in [their]
free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environ-
ments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present
and future generations." 173 To that end the Act requires:
Each component of the national wild and scenic rivers system"
shall* be administered in such manner as to protect and enhance
the values which caused it to be included in said system without,
insofar as is consistent therewith, limiting other uses that do not
substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of these
values. In such administration primary emphasis shall be given
to protecting its esthetic, scenic, historic, archeologic, and scientific
features.174
While the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act seeks to preserve the free-
flowing values of certain rivers by prohibiting further appropria-
tion and use of their waters, a problem is immediately presented
with respect to persons having already acquired rights to those
waters. Absent a navigational servitude or federal reservation,
these rights are rights of property, protected under the fifth
amendment. As such, a further important feature of this Act is
that it authorizes the federal government to exercise its power of
eminent domain "to acquire lands and interests in land within the
authorized boundaries of any component of the national wild
and scenic rivers system."' 75 Furthermore, the Act seeks to not
169. Id. § 1273(a).
170. Id. § 1275(a).
171. Id. § 1271.
172. Id. § 1273(b).
173. Id. § 1271.
174. Id. § 1281(a).
175. Id. § 1277(a).
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only force the state and private sectors to relinquish lands and
waters for the purposes of the Act but also seeks to work in
cooperation with states, at their request, should they desire to par-
ticipate in the inclusion, preservation and administration of rivers
in the national wild and scenic rivers system.176
The irony of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act lies in the fact
that by seeking to preserve streams in their natural free-flowing
condition, it precludes those types of activities which might best
enhance instream values. Indeed, not every free-flowing stream
tends naturally to be in the best condition possible for the enhance-
ment of such values. Dredging and stream augmentation often play
an important role in aiding streams to realize their maximum in-
stream use potential. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act precludes
this type of activity. Furthermore, the reach of the Act is restric-
tively narrow, thus preventing it from being a viable means for
comprehensive instream use protection.
Recent Congressional enactments in the area of pollution control
also provide hope for proponents of instream use protection. The
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act vest
the administrator of the Act with the authority to "develop compre-
hensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating" 177 pollu-
tion of navigable and groundwaters. They also require that "due
regard shall be given to the improvements which are necessary to
conserve such waters for the protection and propagation of fish
andaquatic life and wildlife [and] recreational purposes."'178
Section 102 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1 79 spe-
cifically provides, in subsection (b), that the Army Corps of
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, or other federal agencies,
shall give consideration to the need for storage as a means of aug-
menting stream flows not only for water quality features,180 but also
for "other than . ..water quality" features such as "recreation,
esthetics, and fish and wildlife."''1 As stated in Save Our Invalu-
able Land (SOIL), Inc. v. Needham,182 "[u] nder this particular
approach water [is] stored to be released when the natural flow
in a stream [is] low, thereby augmenting the stream flow and
diluting the pollution entering the stream below the storage facil-
176. See id. § 1276 (c).
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (a) (Supp. V 1975).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 1252.
180. Id. § 1252(b) (1).
181. Id. § 1252(b) (2).
182. 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
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ity."'u 3" Section 102 therefore represents an affirmative effort on
the part of Congress to maintain a minimum flow in navigable
streams through augmentation, if necessary, in order to dilute the
effects of water pollution. Furthermore, in expanding the Act to
make factors other than pollution, such as recreation, aesthetics,
and fish and wildlife, relevant for the purpose of the Act, 84 Con-
gress has given the federal government a valuable tool to be used
in the overall protection of instream values.
Section 208 of the amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act also provides for a comprehensive planning process for
all of the nation's water resources, in an effort to identify and treat
areas having substantial water quality control problems. 185 One
of the explicit goals of section 208 planning, as set forth in Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,8 6 "is the restoration and
maintenance of waters so that by 1983 they will be fit for human
recreation and wildlife propagation." 8 7
Section 208 planning seeks the cooperation of the states in
planning for and reaching water quality goals. It requires the
various state governors to identify each area within their own states
which has substantial water quality control problems, 8 8 and to ap-
point a representative or organization capable of developing effec-
tive waste treatment' plans for the entire area so designated. 80
These representatives or organizations are then required to estab-
lish continuing regulatory programs for identifying pollutants and
treating the waste problems arising therefrom.' 90
Through financial incentives,' 91 Congress has made such a
program attractive to the states. In this manner the federal gov-
ernment may reach water resources beyond federal jurisdiction for
the purposes of both controlling pollution and enhancing instream
values. In addition, under the terms of section 303 of the amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,' 92 a state is re-
quired to adopt water quality standards applicable to intrastate
waters.193 However, if the administrator of the Act determines that
183. Id. at 541.
184. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2) (Supp. V 1975).
185. Id. § 1288.
186. 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.D.C. 1975).
187. Id. at 1387.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (a) (3) (Supp. V 1975).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 1288(b).
191. Id. § 1288(f).
192. Id. § 1313.
193. Id. § 1313(a) (3).
396 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
such standards are not consistent with the applicable requirements
of the Act, he is authorized to, first, notify the state of changes
needed to bring its standards into compliance and, second, to
promulgate standards for that state if compliance is not forth-
coming.1 9 4  Certainly, sections 208 and 303 planning bode well for
advocates of the protection of instream values, particularly those
who have heretofore been frustrated by the state inactivity in
this area.
D. The Future of Federal Involvement
In spite of existing federal statutory and judicial authorities
capable of providing protection for instream values, federal activi-
ty in this area remains largely a matter of piecemeal legislation
together with occasional favorable judicial pronouncements. As
noted by the Water Resources Council in a recent Federal Register
notice, 195 this has led to a number of problems hampering effective
water management:
Federal water policies are frequently not coordinated with over-
all Federal policy. Undesirable results have occurred, such as
navigation projects not consistent with overall transportation policy
and irrigation projects not consistent with agricultural policies.
Federal water resource planning is oriented to construction
projects rather than to comprehensive management of the nation's
resources by all alternative means.
There is a lack of coordination between water quality and water
quantity planning efforts, leading to instances of more costly or less
effective solutions to watershed problems than would be the case
if the planning were less compartmentalized. 19 6
In addition to the lack of an organized, comprehensive approach
to water planning by the federal government, federal regulation
has been, in the past, largely limited to those actions taken by, or
under permit from, the federal government. Although the reach of
the federal government within this area is admittedly broad, it still
has failed to reach the great multitude of water resources not sub-
ject to federal navigation or reservation powers. Indeed, the fed-
eral government has been reluctant to encroach upon the tradi-
tional jurisdiction of the states over nonfederal water use rights.
There are indications, however, that the federal role in water plan-
194. Id. § 1313(a) (3) (C).
195. Water Resources Council, Water Resource Policy Study, Issue and Op-
tion Papers, 42 Fed. Reg. 36,787 (1977).
196. Id. at 36,789-90.
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ning and policy might become more organized and comprehensive
in the future.
In the Water Resources Planning Act,1 97 Congress manifested
an explicit policy in favor of "the conservation, development, and
utilization of water and related land resources of the United States
on a comprehensive and coordinated basis by the Federal Govern-
ment, States, localities, and private enterprise with the cooperation
of all . . .concerned."' 98 The objectives of the Act include: (1)
enhancing regional economic development, (2) improving and pro-
tecting the quality of the total environment, (3) fostering the well-
being of the people of the United States, and (4) fostering economic
development. 199 Perhaps the, major significance of the Water Re-
sources Planning Act is, however, that it represents an attempt by
Congress to explore possible means for formulating a single
national water policy and plan for dealing with the overall prob-
lems facing this nation's water resources.
The Water Resources Planning Act created the Water Resources
Council 20 0 and vested it with the responsibility to maintain a con-
tinuing study of the nation's water resources and related programs
and policies. It is responsible for reporting its findings and recom-
mendations directly to the President,20 ' and for establishing prin-
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 to 1962d-14 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
199. Id. § 1962-2.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1962a (Supp. V 1975). The Water Resources Council was
originally composed of the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, the
Army, and Health, Education and Welfare, and the Chairman of the
Federal Power Commission. A 1975 amendment to section 1962a,
however, changed the composition of the Council by adding the Secre-
taries of Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and Trans-
portation, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency. It also removed the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare from membership on the council.
201. The Council shall-(a) maintain a continuing study and prepare an assess-
ment biennially, or at such less frequent intervals as the
Council may determine, of the adequacy of supplies of water
necessary to meet the water requirements in each water re-
source region in the United States and the national interest
therein; and
(b) maintain a continuing study of the relation of regional
or river basin plans and programs to the requirements of
larger regions of the Nation and of the adequacy of admin-
istrative and statutory means for the coordination of the water
and related land resources policies and programs of the sev-
eral Federal agencies; it shall appraise the adequacy of exist-
ing and proposed policies and programs to meet such require-
ments; and it shall make recommendations to the President
with respect to Federal policies and programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1962a-1 (1970).
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ciples, standards and procedures for the preparation of regional or
river basin plans and federal water projects. 20 2
In 1973 the Water Resources Council, pursuant to the directives
of the Water Resources Planning Act, issued a document setting
forth the principles and standards which it formulated in reference
to a national water resources policy. 203  That document not only
outlined basic national objectives and planning procedures for fed-
erally assisted water resources projects, but also focused upon state,
local and private water management activities. This study has been
made the basis for further action to be taken by the Water Re-
sources Council.
On July 15, 1977, the Water Resources Council issued a notice
announcing the beginning of a Water Resource Policy Study.
20 4
This study is being undertaken at the request of President Carter
who, in his May 23, 1977, Environmental Message to Congress, called
for a comprehensive review of federal water policy. 20 5 The purpose
of the notice issued by the Water Resources Council was "to pre-
sent a summary of the major problems associated with Federal
water resource planning and to suggest a number of options for
solving or reducing these problems."20 0
As a starting point for the study the Water Resources Council
has adopted the basic objectives set forth in its Principles and Stan-
dards,20 7 including, "maintaining or enhancing the natural environ-
ment (Environmental Quality) .,208 In pursuing these objectives,
the Council recognized that broadened federal regulation in favor
of environmental values was a viable option for consideration.
The Council stated the problem as follows:
202. The Council shall establish, after such consultation with
other interested entities, both Federal and non-Federal, as the
Council may find appropriate, and with the approval of the
President, principles, standards, and procedures for Federal
participants in the preparation of comprehensive regional or
river basin plans and for the formulation and evaluation of
Federal water and related land resources projects. Such pro-
cedures may include provision for Council revision of plans for
Federal projects intended to be proposed in any plan or revi-
sion thereof being prepared by a river basin planning commis-
sion.
Id. § 1962a-2.
203. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR PLANNING
WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES (1973) [hereinafter referred to
as Principles and Standards].
204. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,787 (1977).
205. Id. at 36,788.
206. Id.
207. Principles and Standards, supra note 203.
208. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,787, 36,788 (1977).
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The Federal role in water resource development has been criti-
cized as unclear, outdated or inconsistent for a number of functional
areas such as ... outdoor recreation . . . [and] fish and wildlife
enhancement .... This problem may have developed because
policies have not been updated to meet changing needs, clarified
where needed, or developed comprehensively.2 09
The study will be broken into four main issue areas for consid-
eration. However, of particular interest to proponents of instream
use is issue area number three.210  Issue area number three, "in
recognition that environmental quality must be maintained and en-
hanced,"211 will focus upon "an examination of alternative water
resources related institutions.1212 This will necessarily encompass
the effect which. state institutional arrangements should have on
alternate institutions. 21
3
While recognizing the fact that water use rights have tradition-
ally been governed by state law, the Water Resources Council very
bluntly emphasized the fact that it may be time for federal inter-
vention if water quality and quantity are to be preserved for the
nation:
The review . . .will respect the fact that the acquisition, use and
disposition of rights to use water have historically been a matter
of individual State law. But this respect is tempered by the recog-
nition that as demands on the Nation's limited water resources in-
crease, it may be necessary to develop a national perspective both
as to water quantity and quality and to ensure that Federal policies
promote the recognition of realistic goals through changes in exist-
ing institutions at all levels of government. 214
As such, many of the problems focused upon in issue area number
three of the study are a direct attempt to define the future role
which the federal government should play in protecting instream
values. A number of the options which the study will consider
209. Id. at 36,789.
210. "Policy Considerations and Alternatives Relative to Institutions and
Institutional Arrangements." Id. at 36,792.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. [A]n examination of alternative water resources related insti-
tutions is appropriate in a national water resources policy re-
view. The legal and economic institutions influencing water
resources are many and complex. Any review must, there-
fore, be very broad. For the review to be comprehensive, it
should not be limited to what has been traditionally viewed
as strictly Federal areas concerning water resources. This is
because Federal water resources policy and programs are in-
fluenced by other governmental institutions, primarily those
of the States.
Id.
214. Id.
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posit the distinct possibility that the federal government intends
to play a stronger role in the protection of instream values under
a more organized, comprehensive national water policy.
One of the problems which the Water Resources Council will ad-
dress in its study is the fact that federal water subsidies have en-
couraged consumptive use of water resources while failing to pro-
vide the incentives necessary to promote efficiency, water conserva-
tion, and environmental quality.215 As expressed by the Council:
"Disparities in subsidies, including the failure to recognize the value
of alternative uses of water, have resulted in water quality degrada-
tion attributable to overuse. '21 6 As a means for dealing with this
problem the Council has suggested several options, including the
establishment of water use charges to provide incentives for the
most economic use of water, and the institution of a market system
with a concomitant subsidization of the social and environmental
uses of water resources to enable them to compete in the market.
21 7
The Water Resources Council also intends to deal directly with
the problem of laws which impair the recognition of environmen-
tal concerns in the use of water. Practices which the Council claims
may impair recognition of these values include state laws which
fail to provide for the protection of instream values, as well as in-
adequate federal coordination and compliance in the area of in-
stream use protection.21 .8  The options proposed for dealing with
the federal problem include a long-overdue consideration of the
feasibility of vesting a single environmentally oriented agency with
authority to review all federal agencies for compliance and coor-
dination relative to environmental concerns. 21 9 However, the most
radical options to be considered relate to forcing compliance with
environmental objectives upon state and private agencies and in-
dividuals. The options for consideration in this area include the
possible establishment of federal institutions (as opposed to tradi-
tional state institutions) to protect instream values or alternatively,
the possibility of requiring state and local governments to pro-
vide for the protection of instream values. 220  In order to pro-
tect instream values against undue encroachment by state and pri-
vate interests, the study proposes giving authority to the federal
215. Id. See id. at 36,791 (Problem 1).
216. Id. at 36,792.
217. Id. at 36,792-93.
218. Id. at 36,793. See id. at 36,791 (Problem 2).
219. Id. at 36,793.
220. Id.
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government to exercise its powers of eminent domain in order to
compensate "holders of valid rights whose uses are discontinued,
either temporarily or permanently, when the water is needed for
these instream uses."1221 The study furthermore proposes possible
federal sanctions for forcing state compliance with instream use ob-
jectives: "State and local governments could be required to adopt
strategies providing for instream flow needs through State law.
Federal sanctions, through contracting, licensing and permit ap-
proval could be used to implement this alternative."
222
In a somewhat related problem, the Water Resources Council
noted the failure of many state water rights systems to recognize
the relationship between ground and surface waters, and the result-
ing injury to water quantity and quality.223 The options to be con-
sidered in relation to this problem include the possibility of exer-
cising federal powers to force the states to recognize the physical
relationships between surface and groundwater, possible federal
and state cooperation in developing a model water code which
would recognize these relationships, and the conditioning of grants
for water related activities upon the states' implementation of a
legal system recognizing those relationships.224
IV CONCLUSION
The power of the federal government to affirmatively regulate
in favor of instream values cannot seriously be questioned. How-
ever, the issue of the scope of that regulation has been problematic
to the effective protection of those values in the past. Although the
federal government has, through regulation and court adjudication,
attempted to protect instream values to a limited extent, it is be-
coming increasingly clear that a comprehensive federal water policy
which coordinates federal regulation of all of our nation's water
resources may be required if instream values are to be adequately
protected.
The federal government is now apparently ready to seriously
consider comprehensive regulation of water resources through fed-
eral institutions. The fact that it has chosen to give in-depth con-
sideration to the need to protect instream values is encouraging.
It suggests to federal agencies, as well as to state and local govern-
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. See id. at 36,791 (Problem 3).
224. Id. at 36,793.
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ments, that Congress intends to treat instream use as a national
priority. It also acknowledges the possibility that the federal gov-
ernment has the right, if not the duty, to provide impetus and direc-
tion for adequate and effective regulations protecting instream
values, and may indeed exercise those rights in the future.
Lavern Holdeman '78
